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SKILLED MIGRATION: WHEN SHOULD A GOVERNMENT 







  In the brain drain literature models with heterogeneous agents 
typically predict that all agents who get tertiary education will try to 
migrate. Hence, the skill composition of the migration flow is the same as 
that of the skilled population left behind.  This result, however, may not 
represent the migration pattern of some source countries. In this paper I 
present and analyze a model of heterogeneous agents where immigrants go 
through an assimilation process upon arriving to the host country. I start by 
studying the skill composition of the migration flow of a less advanced 
country. Then, I characterize conditions that lead a benevolent government 
to promote migration among the skilled population. I show that the 
government may promote skilled migration despite the fact that the brain 
drain decreases per capita income. 
Keywords: Assimilation process, brain drain, and migration pattern. 
JEL Classification: F22; I28; J24 
 1 Introduction
The international migration of skilled workers, known as a brain drain, is a signi￿cant
phenomenon at the world level, with particularly drastic consequences in poor and devel-
oping countries. Docquier et al (2005), using data of 2000, ￿nd that in Latin America and
the Caribbean, Asia and Africa the average migration rate of skilled workers is 7%, while
at the world level that rate is 5.3%.1
The consequences of the brain drain on the source economy have been studied ex-
tensively in the literature. Models with heterogeneous agents, e.g. Miyagiwa (1994),
Mountford (1997), Beine et al (2001), and Chau and Stark (1999) show that the possibil-
ity of working abroad a⁄ects the education process and, hence, alters the level of human
capital in the source economy.2 Following Beine et al (2001), migration prospects entail
two e⁄ects: a brain e⁄ect and a drain e⁄ect. The brain e⁄ect captures the rise in the size
of the skilled population due to the fact that migration prospects increase the return to
human capital. The drain e⁄ect measures the fall in the size of the skilled population that
follows the migration of skilled workers. In a context of restricted migration, if the brain
e⁄ect dominates the drain e⁄ect the source economy bene￿ts from skilled migration.
Typically, existing literature on brain drain assumes that the possibility of earning
higher wages is the main reason of skilled migration. Of course then, all skilled agents
have incentives to work abroad and since, migrants are randomly selected from the skilled
population, the skill composition of the migration ￿ ow is the same as that of the native
population.3 This result, however, does not represent the migration pattern observed
in some source countries. Table 1 provides cross country data supporting this claim.
Population with tertiary education is grouped according to the International Standard
Classi￿cation of Education (ISCE). At tertiary level, ISCE distinguishes between two
1Moreover, in Latin America, Asia and, Africa the skilled migration is more signi￿cant than unskilled
migration. For these countries, the average unskilled migration rate is 0.3%.
2Assuming homogeneity among agents, Vidal (1998), shows that migration prospects may increase the
level of education in the source economy.
3Exceptions are Miyagiwa (1994) and Chau and Stark (1999). Miyagiwa ￿nds that the most talented
skilled workers always migrate. Therefore, the skilled composition of the migration ￿ ow is not the same as
that of the native population left behind. Chau and Stark consider the possibility of return to migration.
In their model, the skill composition of the migrants that stay abroad di⁄ers from that of the skilled
workers that return to the source country.
1types of programmes: type A programmes and type B programmes. The former provide
quali￿cation for entry into professions with high skill requirements. The latter permit
the acquisition of practical skills. Column 2 shows the skill composition of the adult
population with tertiary education in the source country. The third column shows the skill
composition of immigrants in the US by country of origin. In countries like Argentina,
Mexico and Paraguay the skill composition of the migration ￿ ow is not the same as that
of the native population. More than 50% of their migration ￿ ow is composed of less
able skilled agents, i.e. agents with type B programmes, while the percentage of native
population with tertiary education and with type A programmes is higher than 50%. On
the contrary, in countries like Russia and South Africa more than 50% of the population
with tertiary education has type B programmes. However, their migration ￿ ows are mainly
composed of highly quali￿ed workers.
This is an important observation, as the skill composition of migrants crucially deter-
mines not only the production loss caused by migration in the source country, but also
e.g. the size of remittances. Di⁄erent skill compositions of the migration ￿ ow can have
di⁄erent economic impacts on the source economy. The following questions immediately
arise. How should a government react to this kind of migration? Should a government
always restrict skilled migration? Or should the government restrict skilled migration only
when all the skilled agents want to migrate? Or, given a skill composition of the migra-
tion ￿ ow, should a government restrict skilled migration only when the brain drain hurts
the source economy while promoting skilled migration when the brain drain bene￿ts the
source economy?
These issues cannot be analyzed without studying the factors that determine the com-
position of the migration ￿ ow. In the current paper I characterize di⁄erent migration
patterns. Then, I consider the existence of a benevolent government that seeks to maxi-
mize the welfare of those left behind and determine conditions under which the government
promotes the migration of skilled workers.
In this paper I make two non-standard assumptions. Both are crucial. The ￿rst one is
that agents not only migrate because of the possibility of earning a higher wage, but also
because of the existence of a lack of employment opportunities for graduates in the source
economy. The second assumption is that skilled agents must go through an assimilation
2process when they arrive to the host country. These two assumptions allow me to capture
some e⁄ects on the skill composition of the migration ￿ ow that are not detected in the
previous models.
The existing literature typically assume full employment in the source economy. As
a result, some e⁄ects that unemployment has on both education and migration are not
detected. For instance, some agents might refrain from becoming skilled since they know
that they may fail in getting a skilled job, while others are encouraged to leave their own
country. In addition, the assumption of full employment is not in accordance with the
reality of some poor and developing countries. According to the World Bank, in some
countries there is a lack of employment for graduates because of misguided educational
policies that result in a large supply of college graduates for whom no suitable jobs exist.4
Regarding my second assumption, existing models with heterogeneous agents assume
that immigrants earn the same wage as natives with equivalent skill levels since they arrive
to the host country. Nevertheless, empirical literature shows that immigrants go through
an assimilation process when they arrive to the host economy.5 The assimilation process
includes the acquisition of information about the host labor market conditions, the im-
provement of language skills, the validation of the education credential and so on. During
this process immigrants are not paid according to their educational attainment. Conse-
quently, their earnings are smaller than those of natives with equivalent skill levels. In
the source country, however, ￿rms match the wage they pay with the agents￿educational
attainment. Consequently, the opportunity cost of working abroad rises with the educa-
tional level. Therefore, the assimilation process may induce the most talented agents to
prefer to work in their own country.
I have mentioned above that the brain drain may bene￿t the source economy. Beine et
al (2003) provide empirical support showing that the brain drain bene￿ts those countries
that have low levels of human capital and low skilled migration rate. For instance, they
obtain that, among other countries, India and Brazil bene￿t from this type of migration,
which is not the case of the Philippines and Mexico.
According to the World Bank there are countries that promote migration of skilled
4See Global Economic Prospects 2006.
5See Daneshvary et al (1992), Borjas (1999) and Wei-Yin Hu (2000).
3workers, e.g. India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, etc. Of course, it is not surprising that
countries that bene￿t from this type of migration apply such a policy. However, why should
a country like the Philippines, which does not bene￿t from the brain drain, promote skilled
migration?
Results that I present in this paper are important, as they o⁄er an explanation to the
situations mentioned above. The model shows that when the migration pattern is such
that all skilled agents want to migrate, the government promotes skilled migration only
if the brain drain bene￿ts the source economy. Interestingly, the model highlights the
possibility that in a context where the most talented skilled agents prefer not to migrate,
the government promotes skilled migration despite the fact that the brain drain hurts the
source economy. It has to do with remittances sent by less able skilled workers are higher
than the income they would produce, if they stayed in the source economy. Therefore,
the government curtails the fall in per capita income that follows the brain drain by
encouraging migration among less able skilled agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 I present the benchmark
model where skilled workers are not allowed to migrate. In Section 3 I extend the model
to an economy where migration is risky and skilled agents have to decide whether to work
abroad or not. Section 4 presents the e⁄ects of a selective immigration policy on the
composition of the migration ￿ ow. Section 5 presents some migration policies applied by
a government who wants to maximize per capita income in the source country. Finally, in
Section 6 I conclude. Proofs are gathered in an Appendix.
2 The benchmark model without migration
Consider a small open economy in a world where only one good is produced by means of
both skilled and unskilled labor. The good is exchanged in competitive markets. There
is a continuum of agents. For simplicity I normalize the size of the population to one.
Heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that agents possess di⁄erent abilities to learn,
i.e. ability to transform knowledge, acquired by investing in higher education, into pro-
ductive skills. Every individual has an ability a; which is distributed continuously on a























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5is the corresponding cumulative distribution function.6 For the moment I assume that
international migration is not allowed. Consequently, individuals must decide whether to
remain unskilled or to invest in higher education. Since agents do not have resources of
their own, they must borrow to ￿nance the educational cost C, at a given interest rate r.
In the sequel, c represents the discounted value of the educational cost.
I assume that both skilled and unskilled individuals supply labor services for their
remaining working lifetime which is normalized to one, once the education process has
￿nished. Lifetime income is, therefore, denoted in present value discounted at a rate r:
I assume that one unit of unskilled labor produces w units of the aggregate good. By
competition, the wage of unskilled workers is w. Those who work in skilled jobs earn an
income according to their productivity. However, investing in higher education is not a
su¢ cient condition for working as skilled worker. More precisely, there is an exogenous
probability p; with p 2 [0;1), with which skilled agent will fail to ￿nd a skilled job and,
thus, will end up working as an unskilled worker. In that case her lifetime income will be
w ￿c.7 With probability 1￿p she will get a job as a skilled worker and will earn wa￿c:
Note that every skilled agent has to repay the educational cost, independently of the job
she ￿nally gets.
Individuals are assumed to be risk neutral. Hence, an agent with ability a invests in
higher education if and only if the return to education is higher than w, that is,
pw + (1 ￿ p)wa ￿ c ￿ w: (1)
This de￿nes a threshold ability level b a such that, only individuals with abilities above b a
will get education. The cuto⁄ level is,




The population is divided into those who remain unskilled and those who invest in
higher education. The higher is p, that is, the more di¢ cult is to ￿nd a skilled job, the
smaller the number of individuals who get higher education. A proportion p of skilled
6A is assumed to be high enough in order to guarantee that at least the most able agents always ￿nd
pro￿table to invest in higher education.
7I assume that p is strictly smaller than 1; since if there were full unemployment of skilled workers
nobody would choose to become skilled.
6agents ends up working in unskilled jobs, where their knowledge is useless. As a result,
per capita income, net of the cost of education (y in the sequel) is,
y = w(G(b a) + p(1 ￿ G(b a)) + H) ￿ c(1 ￿ G(b a)); (3)
where,




3 Equilibrium with migration
In this section I allow skilled individuals to migrate. However, migration need not to be
successful. There is an exogenous probability ￿ of migration being successful. The reason
for this assumption is that most developed countries restrict immigration by giving a
limited number of entry visas. I assume that those individuals who are eligible to migrate
have to pay a migration cost M, where M ￿ 0. Besides, they go through a period of
assimilation when they arrive to the host country. The assimilation process takes up a
fraction of time ￿, where ￿ 2 [0;1]. During this process their wage is equal to that of
native unskilled workers, wF. Once they are assimilated, they earn the same wage as
natives workers possessing an equivalent skill level. Thereby, the income of an immigrant
of ability a is W(a), with
W(a) = ￿wF + (1 ￿ ￿)wFa ￿ c ￿ M: (5)
In order to have some positive migration I assume that wF > w + c + M.
An agent ￿rst decides whether to become skilled or to remain unskilled. Unskilled
agents earn a wage w. Skilled agents decide whether to look for a skilled job in their own
country or to look for a skilled job abroad. Consider a skilled agent with ability a. She
may prefer to look for a skilled job in her own country and try to migrate only if she fails
7in getting that job.8 In this case her expected income is denoted by I (a) and is given by:
I (a) = (1 ￿ p)(wa ￿ c) + p(￿W (a) + (1 ￿ ￿)(w ￿ c)): (6)
On the other hand, she may prefer to work abroad, and look for a skilled job in her
own country only if she fails in migrating. In this case her expected income is denoted by
IF (a) and is given by:
IF (a) = ￿W (a) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pw + (1 ￿ p)wa ￿ c): (7)
Now, I solve the model backwards. I start by determining agents￿migration decisions.
Then, I determine agents￿education decisions. Finally, I characterize the equilibrium
migration pattern.
3.1 Skilled Agents￿Migration Decisions
In this subsection I determine migration decisions of skilled workers. If a skilled agent ￿rst
looks for a skilled job in the source economy, it re￿ ects that she prefers not to migrate.
On the contrary, if she ￿rst looks for a skilled job abroad, it re￿ ects that she prefers to
migrate. Consider a skilled agent with ability a. She prefers to migrate if and only if:
IF (a) > I (a) ,
a > aM;
where:
aM ￿ 1 ￿
wF ￿ w ￿ M
(1 ￿ ￿)wF ￿ w
: (8)
The cuto⁄ value aM is discontinuous at ￿ = b ￿, where:
b ￿ = 1 ￿
w
wF : (9)
8I do not consider the case where a skilled agent refuses the possibility of trying to migrate despite she
has gotten an unskilled job. This decision is not optimal. Assume that this agent exists, her income is
w ￿ c. She chooses not to migrate if and only if w ￿ c > W (a). Since she only wants to work in her own
country her ability is as least higher than b a0 (see Section (2)). W (a) is increasing in a, so, I have that:
w ￿ c > W (b a0) , w > w
F ￿ c ￿ M;
which is a contradiction.
8Therefore, depending on the value of ￿; aM may not exist. In particular, I have three














. In the ￿rst case ￿ is very
low meaning that assimilation takes a very short time. I ￿nd that aM > 0 and skilled
agents with abilities below aM ￿rst look for a skilled job in their own country whereas
agents with abilities above aM ￿rst try to migrate. In the second case, the length of the
assimilation process is such that aM is negative. This means that all skilled agents prefer
to work abroad. They look for a skilled job in their own country only if migration fails.
In the following subsection I show that I can discard the ￿rst case. Hence, when ￿ is
smaller than b ￿, the opportunity cost of working abroad is that small that all skilled agents
prefer to work abroad. Finally, in the third case the length of the assimilation process is
large enough such that the opportunity cost of working abroad, i.e. ￿wF, overweights the
wage di⁄erential. Therefore, agents with abilities above aM prefer to look for a skilled
job in their own country. They try to migrate, only if they fail in getting that job. On
the contrary, agents with abilities below aM ￿rst try to migrate.9 The following lemma
summarizes these results.
Lemma 1





, agents with abilities below (above) aM prefer to work in the source
economy (abroad).





; all skilled agents ￿rst try to migrate.




, agents with abilities above (below) aM prefer to work in the source
economy (abroad).
Before leaving this subsection note that the cuto⁄ value aM, when it exists and it is
positive, does not depend on the probability of migrating. This stems from the fact that
the return to human capital for a skilled agent with productivity aM is not a⁄ected by
migration prospects. In her own country, she earns an income equal to that obtained
abroad, i.e. waM ￿ c = W (aM).
9The cuto⁄ level aM is such that lim
￿￿!b ￿
aM = ￿1 and lim
￿+!b ￿
aM = 1. If I consider the possibility that
aM > A, when aM > 1, the analysis is the same than that when ￿ < b ￿ and hence aM < 1. Thereby, for
the sake of the exposition I assume that A is always higher than aM.
93.2 Agents￿Education Decisions
I call e aE and b aE the cuto⁄ values satisfying I (e aE) = w and IF (b aE) = w; respectively.
e aE = 1 +
c ￿ p￿
￿
wF ￿ w ￿ M
￿
p￿ (1 ￿ ￿)wF + (1 ￿ p)w
; (10)
b aE = 1 +
c ￿ ￿
￿
wF ￿ w ￿ M
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)wF + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)w
: (11)
Both threshold levels are negatively related to the probability of migrating. This accounts
for how agents￿incentives to invest in higher education are a⁄ected by migration opportu-
nities. A rise in ￿ increases the expected return to human capital and, hence, encourages
some previously unskilled agents to invest in higher education.
Let e ￿ and e ￿ be equal to:
e ￿ =
c
wF ￿ w ￿ M
; (12)
and,




wF (1 ￿ p(1 ￿ ￿)): (13)




; the cuto⁄ value e aE is the education threshold
level. If, however, ￿ < e ￿ the education cuto⁄ value is b aE.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Recall that the expected income of an agent who tries to migrate as a last resort is
given by I (a). Keep in mind that I obtained the cuto⁄ value e aE by equating I (a) with
w. Then, when the probability of migrating is too small and the assimilation process is
extremely high, I have that e aE < b aE. It means that all agents with abilities above e aE
become skilled with the intention of working in a skilled job in their own country. They
try to migrate only if they fail in getting that job. This is not the case when the education
threshold level is given by b aE, i.e. when b aE < e aE.
Now, I am ready to characterize equilibrium migration patterns.
10Proposition 1




all agents with abilities above b aE become skilled and prefer to work abroad.
They work in the source economy only if migration fails.




, agents with abilities above b aE become skilled. Those skilled agents with
abilities below aM prefer to work abroad. Skilled agents with abilities above aM try
to migrate only if they fail in getting a skilled job in the source economy.




and ￿ 2 (0;e ￿], all agents with abilities above e aE become skilled and
prefer to ￿nd a skilled job in their own country. They try to migrate as a last resort.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 1 shows the three types of migration patterns. In the horizontal axes I draw
ability and in the vertical axes expected incomes. In Figure 1A all agents with abilities
above b aE get higher education with the intention of migrating. The expected income
IF (a) is higher than that of any other alternative. Figure 1B corresponds to Type II
migration pattern. In this case agents with abilities in the interval [b aE;aM] prefer to work
abroad. The most talented agents, however, prefer to try to get a skilled job in their
own country. For them the expected income I (a) is higher than that of any other choice.
Figure 1C corresponds to Type III migration pattern. All agents with abilities above e aE
become skilled with the intention of trying to get a skilled job in their own country.
The length of the assimilation process together with the wage di⁄erential determine
the type of migration pattern. Note that the higher is the wage di⁄erential, i.e. the
smaller is w
wF , the less stringent is the condition ￿ < b ￿. Figure 2 illustrates this issue. The
bold line corresponds to Equation (9), i.e. b ￿, while the curve corresponds to Equation
(13), i.e. e ￿. In the horizontal axis I draw the wage di⁄erential, i.e. w
wF . The maximum
value this ratio can attain is ! = wF￿c￿M
wF . In the vertical axis I draw values of ￿. The
area below the bold line corresponds to the equilibrium where every skilled agent ￿rst
tries to migrate. This area is denoted by I. On the other hand, the area in between
the bold line and the curve corresponds to the equilibrium where the most able agents




in region II represent a situation where the assimilation process takes a relatively large
11period of time. This negatively a⁄ects the return to human capital abroad, inducing the
most talented skilled agents to try to migrate only if they fail in getting a skilled job in
their own country. Finally, the area above the function e ￿ corresponds to the case where
all skilled agents prefer to look for a skilled job in the source economy. I denote this area
by III. Now, consider two economies, P and R, that only di⁄er in their wage rate. In
particular, wP < wR. Observe that in economy P; there are more values of ￿ that satisfy
￿ < b ￿
P
compared to those values of ￿ that satisfy ￿ < b ￿
R
in economy R. Therefore, Type
I equilibrium is more likely to arise in the poorer economy, i.e. in P.
Corollary 1 The poorer is the source economy, as measured by the wage di⁄erential, the
more likely is Type I migration pattern.
4 Selective Immigration Policy
The signi￿cance of the international migration of highly skilled workers may be partly
explained by a selective immigration policy that some developed countries apply. Lowell
(2001) mentions that countries like Australia and Germany among others have increased
their intake of highly skilled agents through programmes that promote immigration of
highly skilled agents. On the other hand, Canada applies a point system that favors skilled
immigration. Applicants must pass a test which asks about applicants￿age, educational
attainment, etc. Applicants who have graduate or professional degree get a given number
of points. However, those who are high schools drop outs get zero points. At the end of
the test applicants must score a minimum number of points in order to be eligible for an
entry visa.10
In this subsection, I drop the assumption that immigrants are randomly selected from
the skilled population in the source economy. On the contrary, I assume that the host
country does not restrict the immigration of highly skilled workers. Hence, migration is
certain only for those agents with abilities higher than a given threshold level a. I assume
that a is in the interval (x;A), where x = maxfe aE;b aE;aMg. Without loss of generality I
assume that agents with abilities above a do not go through the assimilation process. As
a result, an agent with ability a, with a > a; earns the following income abroad:


















































13W (a) = wFa ￿ c ￿ M: (14)
It is easy to check that W (a) is higher than I (a) for every a higher than a. Consequently,
the most talented agents always migrate. On the other hand, expected incomes of less
able skilled agents may be I (a) or IF (a), depending on their choices.
Whenever the assimilation process is not large enough, i.e. ￿ < b ￿; the skill composition
of the migration ￿ ow is the same as in Equilibrium I. That is, the equilibrium where all




; migrants are mainly drawn from
the tails of the skill distribution. In this case I have that w ￿ IF (a) and I (a) < IF (a)
for all a 2 [b aE;aM). Therefore, agents with abilities in between b aE and aM get higher
education with the intention of migrating. On the other hand, if agents￿abilities are in
the interval [aM;a) their expected incomes are such that IF (a) ￿ I (a). As a result, these
skilled agents try to migrate as a last resort. Finally, those agents with abilities higher than
a migrate. Figure 3 illustrates this migration pattern. Figure 4 shows the migration ￿ ow
that arises when the assimilation process is extremely high, that is ￿ ￿ e ￿. In this scenario
the lack of employment opportunities turns out to be the main cause of migration for those
with abilities below a. They get education with the intention of working in the source
country and hence, they migrate as a last resort. Still and all, the most talented work-




















14Summarizing, if the host country applies a selective immigration policy it is possible
that the most able skilled agents together with the least able skilled agents get education
with the intention of working abroad, while agents with intermediate abilities migrate as
a last resort.
For the sake of brevity and without loss of generality in the following section I focus
on the case where migrants are randomly selected from the skilled population.
5 Government Intervention
Migration prospects entail a brain e⁄ect and a drain e⁄ect. The former refers to the rise in
the size of the skilled population. This is due to the fact that migration prospects increase
the return to education. The latter refers to the fall in human capital that follows skilled
migration. Depending on the value of the probability ￿, the brain drain may bene￿t the
source economy.11 Therefore, the government can foster the brain e⁄ect and ameliorate
the drain e⁄ect through implementing either a Promoting Migration Policy (PMP) or a
Restrictive Migration Policy (RMP). The PMP consists in encouraging agents to become
skilled and to try to migrate by subsidizing migration and/or education. On the contrary,
the RMP consists in discouraging agents from migrating by levying a tax on migration
and/or on education.
I consider a government that seeks to maximize per capita income net of education
costs. I assume that successful migrants remit a percentage ￿; with ￿ 2 [0;1]; of their
income. Besides, I assume that parameters ￿; p; w and wF are known and hence, the
government is acquainted with the composition of the migration ￿ ow that arises in the
decentralized economy.12 For the sake of clarity, in this section I present the maximization
problem associated with Type II equilibrium. Results corresponding to the other two
types of equilibria are presented in the Appendix.
Let PII and yII (e a;￿) stand for the size of the population left behind and per capita
11On this respect see Mountford (1997), Vidal (1998), Chau and Stark (1999). Conditions that ensure
a rise in per capita income net of education costs are presented in the Appendix.
12Superscripts of function refer to the type of migration pattern.
15income, respectively. The government chooses an education cuto⁄value e a and a migration







s.t.: ￿ = e a + ";
" ￿ 0:
(15)



















￿(e a;￿) = yII (e a;￿) + ￿W (￿); (18)
and,
￿II (e a;￿) = ￿yII (e a;￿) + (￿￿W (e a) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pw + (1 ￿ p)we a ￿ c)): (19)
A⁄ecting skilled agents￿willingness to migrate entails bene￿ts and costs. Consider
a skilled agent of ability ￿. She gets a skilled job with probability ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p).
Given this probability, Expression (18) is the marginal bene￿t of inducing her to migrate.
The ￿rst term captures the rise in per capita income due to a decrease in the size of the
population left behind. The second term, ￿W (￿), is the migrant agent￿ s contribution
to per capita income. The foregone income associated with this decision is w￿ ￿ c; her
contribution to per capita income if she prefers not to migrate. As a result, Condition
(16) is satis￿ed when ￿ is such that the marginal bene￿t of inducing an additional agent
to migrate is equal to the marginal cost.
A⁄ecting agents￿incentives to invest in higher education involves bene￿ts and costs.
Expression (19) represents the marginal bene￿t of inducing an additional agent of ability
e a to become skilled. The ￿rst term captures the rise in per capita income due to a
reduction in the size of the population left behind. Terms in brackets represent skilled
agent￿ s expected contribution to per capita income. The marginal cost associated with
this decision is equal to w, i.e. the agent￿ s contribution to per capita income if she stays
unskilled. As a result, the second term of Condition (17) is zero when ￿II (e a;￿) is equal
to the marginal cost w.
16Expressions (16) and (17) can be rewritten in the following way:
W (￿) + tm(e a;￿) = w￿ ￿ c; (16￿ )
tII (e a;￿) + IF (e a) = w; (17￿ )
where,
tm(e a;￿) = yII (e a;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)W (￿); (20)
tII (e a;￿) = ￿
￿
yII (e a;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)W (e a)
￿
: (21)
Consider Equation (17￿ ) and let e a = b aE, that is the education cuto⁄ value that arises
in the decentralized equilibrium. Remember that in the decentralized equilibrium the
educational cuto⁄ value is such that IF (b aE) = w. If the government encourages more
agents to get higher education the optimal value of e a is smaller than b aE. Keeping in
mind that IF (a) is increasing in a, IF (e a) < w implying that tII (e a;￿) must be positive.
Applying the same reasoning, I ￿nd that a positive (negative) value of tm(e a;￿) means that
the government subsidies (taxes) skilled migration. In such a case, ￿ is higher (smaller)
than aM:
Proposition 2 In Type II migration pattern, if tm(b aE;aM) is positive then a PMP is
applied. On the contrary, if tII (b aE;aM) is negative then a RMP is applied.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Remember that in a Type II equilibrium, the least able skilled agents prefer to mi-
grate, whereas, the most talented skilled agents prefer to get a skilled job in the source
economy. That is, migration preferences vary among skilled agents. This makes it di¢ cult
to ￿nd necessary and su¢ cient conditions for having either a PMP or a RMP: Note that
Proposition (2) only states su¢ cient conditions. When the wage di⁄erential is enough high
such that an agent with ability aM contributes more to per capita income by migrating,
i.e. ￿(b aE;aM) > waM ￿c, then the government encourages more agents to migrate. The
government ￿nds convenient to apply both a subsidy to migration and to education. On
the contrary, when the wage di⁄erential is small enough such that a skilled agent with
ability b aE is more productive in the source economy, i.e. ￿II (b aE;aM) < w, then the
government restricts migration. It levies a tax on both education and migration.
17Proposition 3
(i) In Type I migration pattern a PMP (RMP) is applied if and only if the Expression
below is positive (negative).
tI (b aE) = yI (b aE) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)W (b aE): (22)
(ii) In Type III migration pattern a PMP (RMP) is applied if and only if the Expres-
sion below is positive (negative).
tIII (e aE) = yIII (e aE) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)W (e aE): (23)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Under Type I migration pattern, a positive value of (22) implies that the marginal
bene￿t of inducing an agent of ability b aE of becoming skilled is higher than the marginal
cost. Therefore, the government fosters the brain e⁄ect by subsidizing higher education.
The same reasoning applies to Type III migration pattern. In these equilibria migration
preferences do not vary among skilled population. In Type I equilibrium all skilled agents
￿rst try to migrate, whereas, in Type III migration pattern, all skilled agents ￿rst try
to get a skilled job in the source economy. Therefore, by subsidizing (taxing) higher
education, the government promotes (restricts) skilled migration.
The following corollaries relate the e⁄ect of the brain drain on per capita income with
the kind of migration policy the government applies.
Corollary 2 Consider Type I and Type III migration patterns. If the government applies
a PMP then in the decentralized equilibrium the brain drain increases per capita income.
However, if the brain drain decreases per capita income then a RMP is applied.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Corollary 3 Consider Type II migration pattern. The government may apply a PMP
despite the fact that the brain drain decreases per capita income.
18Proof. See Appendix D.
Consider Type II equilibrium. The fact that migration preferences vary among the
skilled population allows for the possibility that the government applies a PMP despite
the fact that the brain drain decreases per capita income. Assume that the brain drain
reduces per capita income. The government can establish a tax on migration and a subsidy
to education such that the size of the migrant population increases. This policy curtails
the fall in per capita income that follows skilled migration. The reason is that the tax
on migration retains the most able agents, among those who prefer to migrate, and the
subsidy to education increases the in￿ ow of remittances by encouraging the least able
agents to work abroad.
Since in Type I and in Type III equilibria migration preferences are homogeneous
among skilled agents, the situation described above is not feasible. The government cannot
mitigate the fall in per capita income by changing migration preferences of the most able
skilled agents. In particular, Corollary (2) says that under these type of migration patterns,
the government has to restrict skilled migration whenever the brain drain hurts the source
economy.
6 Concluding Remarks
In the brain drain literature models with heterogeneous agents typically show that agents
get higher education with the intention of working abroad. Interestingly, my model high-
lights the possibility that some agents get higher education with the intention of working
in the source economy. This possibility arises when the length of time that immigrants
need to catch up with the wage of natives with equivalent skill levels is relatively large.
In other words, when the opportunity cost of working abroad is relatively high for the
most talented skilled workers. They ￿rst try to get a skilled job in the source economy,
and try to migrate only if they fail in getting that job. On the other hand, the model
shows that the migration pattern where all skilled agents prefer to migrate is more likely
to arise in poor economies. It is in these economies where the wage di⁄erential o⁄sets the
opportunity cost associated with the assimilation process.
In Section 3 I assumed that the assimilation parameter ￿ is ￿xed and common to all
19skilled immigrants. However, the assimilation process could vary across immigrants even
if they are of the same nationality. More talented agents could assimilate faster to the host
labor market than less able skilled agents do. Therefore, endogenizing ￿ may detect some
migration patterns that do not arise in this model. In Section 4, however, I relaxed the
assumption that ￿ is common to all skilled agents. In that section I assumed that the host
country applies a selective immigration policy that promotes immigration of highly skilled
agents. Under this scenario, the model shows that it is possible that migrants be mainly
drawn from the tails of the skill distribution. Skilled agents with intermediate abilities
￿rst try to get a skilled job in the source economy. However, the most able skilled agents
together with the least able skilled agents invest in higher education with the intention of
working abroad.
I analyzed government intervention. I considered a benevolent government that is
acquainted with the skill composition of the migration ￿ ow. The government weighs the
bene￿ts against the costs of encouraging agents to migrate. The model shows that when
migration preferences do not di⁄er among the skilled population the government promotes
(restricts) skilled migration whenever the brain drain bene￿ts (hurts) the source economy.
Interestingly, the model highlights the possibility that the government promotes skilled
migration even when the brain drain hurts the source economy. This possibility arises
when migration preferences di⁄er among the skilled population. More precisely, when the
most talented skilled agents prefer to work in the source economy while the less talented
skilled agents prefer to work abroad. The government applies a subsidy to education and
a migration tax such that the size of the migrant ￿ ow increases. This policy curtails the
fall in per capita income. On the one hand, the subsidy to education encourages less able
agents to become skilled and migrate, leading to rise in the size of remittances. On the
other hand, the migration tax retains the most talented agents among those who prefer
to migrate. This result o⁄ers an explanation why countries that do not bene￿t from the
brain drain promote this type of migration.
Finally, just a remark to say that this simple model can be generalized by endogenizing
the probability that captures unemployment among skilled workers p; assuming that it is
positively related to the number of skilled workers in the source economy. However, the
equilibria of the model do not depend on that assumption. The only disadvantage of
20assuming p exogenous is related with government￿ s maximization problem. There is a
bene￿t that is not captured in this model. It is the fact that skilled migration relieves
skilled job market pressures.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 2.
Let ￿ be equal to wF ￿ w ￿ M. The cuto⁄ value e aE is higher than b aE if and only if:
￿ (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)) > ￿c
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)wF ￿ w
￿
,; (24)
after rearranging terms I get that,
￿ < e ￿: (25)
If ￿ 2 (0;e ￿]; the cuto⁄ e ￿ may be smaller than 1. As a result, e aE is smaller than b aE





It is possible to show that e ￿ > 1 for all ￿ 2 [e ￿;1]. Hence, b aE < e aE whenever ￿ 2 [e ￿;1].
Before proving Proposition 1 I state the following Lemmas.
Lemma 3 If e aE is the education threshold level, then aM < e aE.
Proof.
Let ￿ be equal to wF ￿ w ￿ M. I have that aM < e aE ,;
￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)wF ￿ w
<
c ￿ ￿p￿
￿p(1 ￿ ￿)wF + (1 ￿ p)w
; (26)
If e aE is the education threshold level, by Lemma (2), I have that ￿ > e ￿ > b ￿: Then, the
denominator of the left hand side is negative. Therefore, after rearranging terms I have:
￿ (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)) > ￿c
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)wF ￿ w
￿
,; (27)
￿ > e ￿: (28)
21Lemma 4 b aE is smaller than aM whenever ￿ > b ￿. On the contrary, aM is smaller than










that both cuto⁄ values are higher than 1. Then, b aE < aM if and only if:
c
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)wF ￿ w
￿
> ￿￿ (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)) ,; (29)
￿ < e ￿: (30)
By hypothesis the last inequality holds. If ￿ > e ￿, I have that e ￿ > 1, then the last inequality
still holds. In particular, in this case I have: b aE < 1 < aM.




. First, consider the case where ￿ 2 (0;e ￿]. In
this case aM < 1 < b aE. Finally, assume that ￿ > e ￿. Both cuto⁄ values are smaller than
1. Then, aM < b aE if and only if:
￿￿ (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)) < c
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)wF ￿ w
￿
(31)
The left hand side of the last inequality is negative, while the right hand side is positive.
Hence, aM < b aE.
Proof of Proposition 1.
I start with Case (I). By Lemma (2) b aE is the educational cuto⁄value. By Lemma (4),
I have that aM < b aE: Lemma (1) implies that all skilled agents with abilities above aM
prefer to work abroad. All of this implies that all agents with abilities above b aE become
skilled and prefer to work abroad.
I turn to Case (II). By Lemma (2) b aE is the educational cuto⁄ value. By Lemma (4),
I have that b aE < aM. Lemma (1) implies that all skilled agents with abilities below aM
prefer to work abroad. All of this implies that agents with abilities in (b aE;aM) become
skilled and try to migrate. On the other hand, agents with abilities above aM become
skilled and ￿rst try to get a skilled job in the source economy.
Finally, consider Case (III). By Lemma (2) e aE is the educational cuto⁄ value. By
Lemma (3), I have that aM < e aE. Lemma (1) implies that all skilled agents with abilities
below aM prefer to work abroad. All of this implies that all agents with abilities above
22e aE become skilled and try to migrate only if they fail to get a skilled job in the source
economy.
Appendix B: Government￿ s intervention.
I start by Type I migration pattern. Let PI and yI denote the population left behind
and per capita income net of education costs, respectively. The government chooses the
cuto⁄ value e a above which agents become skilled so as to maximize per capita income.


















￿I (e a) = ￿yI + (￿￿W (e a) + (1 ￿ ￿)(pw + (1 ￿ p)we a ￿ c)): (34)
Expression ￿I (e a) represents marginal bene￿t of inducing an additional agent of ability e a
of becoming skilled, while w is the marginal cost. Hence, the FOC is zero if and only if
￿I (e a) = w, or equivalently,
tI (e a) + IF (e a) = w; (35)
where,
tI (e a) = ￿
￿
yI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)W (e a)
￿
: (36)
A positive value of tI (e a) means that the government is subsidizing education, and hence,
migration. Quite the reverse, a negative value corresponds to the case where the govern-
ment is restricting migration through a tax on migration (or on education).
I turn to study government￿ s intervention when the migration pattern is Type III.
That is, when all skilled agents prefer to try to get a skilled job in the source economy. The
government chooses a cuto⁄ value e a above which agents become skilled. The government
solves the following problem:
maxfe ag yIII (e a)
s:t: : e a > aM
(37)
13Remember that in the decentralized equilibrium aM < b aE. In particular, aM < 0. Therefore, under














￿III (e a) ￿ w
￿
= 0;
￿e a = 0; (39)
where,
￿III (e a) = ￿pyIII + ((1 ￿ p)we a + p(￿￿W (e a) + (1 ￿ ￿)(w ￿ c))): (40)
￿III (e a) represents the marginal bene￿ts of inducing an additional agent of ability e a of
getting higher education. The parameter w corresponds to the marginal cost associated to
this decision. Considering the interior solution, i.e. aM < e a; the FOC can also be written
in the following way:14
I (e a) + tIII (e a) = w; (41)
where,
tIII (e a) = ￿p
￿
yIII ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)W (e a)
￿
: (42)
A positive (negative) value of t(e a) corresponds to a subsidy (tax) to migration (or
education).
Appendix C: E⁄ects of the drain on per capita income
In this part of the Appendix I compute the e⁄ect of the brain drain on per capita
income of the source economy. This result will be used in proofs of Propositions (3)
and (2) and in Corollaries (2) and (3). The following equations measures the di⁄erence
between per capita income of equilibrium J and per capita income of the economy without
migration, i.e. ￿J = yJ ￿ y.
14Remember that in type III migration pattern; aM is higher than 1: Therefore, in the case of a corner




W (a)g (a)da + ￿y (1 ￿ G(b aE)) + ￿c(1 ￿ G(b a)) +
+BE ￿ ￿w(G(b a) ￿ G(b aE)); (43)
￿II = RII + ￿￿y + ￿cp(1 ￿ G(aM)) ￿ ￿
aM Z
b a
(pw + (1 ￿ p)wa ￿ c)g (a)da








(pw + (1 ￿ p)wa ￿ c)g (a)da +












BE = (1 ￿ ￿)
b a Z
b aE
((1 ￿ p)(wa ￿ w) ￿ c)g (a)da; (47)
￿ = ￿ (G(aM) ￿ G(b aE) + p(1 ￿ G(aM))): (48)
Expressions (43)-(45) must be positive in order to the brain drain increases per capita
income in the source economy.
Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 2.
I start by showing that a tax on education implies a tax on migration, that is:
tII (e a;￿) < 0 ) tm(e a;￿) < 0; for all e a and ￿; (49)
since tII (e a;￿) < 0 I have that:
0 > yII ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)W (e a), and
yII ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)W (e a) > tm(e a;￿): (50)
25Therefore, tII (b aE;aM) < 0 implies that tm(b aE;aM) < 0. On the contrary, tm(b aE;aM) >
0 implies that tII (b aE;aM) > 0.
Now, consider an interior solution. Using (17) and (20) I have that ￿II (b aE;aM) >
w , tII (b aE;aM) > 0. Then, if tII (b aE;aM) > 0 )
dyII
de a je a=b aE < 0 ) e a < b aE, i.e. the
government gives a subsidy tII (e a;￿) to education. On the other hand, using Expressions
(16) and (20) I have: ￿(b aE;aM) > waM ￿ c , tm(b aE;aM) > 0. If tm(b aE;aM) > 0 )
dyII
d" j￿=aM > 0 ) " > 0. Thus, the government gives a subsidy tm(b aE;aM) to migration.
A positive value of tm(b aE;aM) implies that tII (b aE;aM) > 0. This implies that e a < b aE
and ￿ > aM. Hence, the government enlarges the size of the migrant population when
tm(b aE;aM) is positive.
On the other hand, a negative value of tII (b aE;aM) implies tm(b aE;aM) < 0. This
implies that e a > b aE and ￿ < aM. So that, the government restricts the size of the migrant
population when tII (b aE;aM) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Consider Type I migration pattern. Using Expressions (32) and (35) I have that
￿I (b aE) > w , tI (b aE) > 0: Then, if tI (b aE) > 0, by (32), I have that
dyI
de a je a=b aE < 0 )
e a < b aE, i.e. the government gives a subsidy tI (e a) either to education or to migration.
If, however, tI (b aE) < 0 ) e a > b aE: That is, the government applies a tax. The same
reasoning applies to Type III migration pattern.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Recall Expressions (43) and (45). They measure the e⁄ect of the brain drain on per
capita income. First, I show that a PMP implies that ￿J > 0, with J = fI;IIIg. After
that, I show that ￿J < 0, implies a RMP.
I start by Type I migration pattern. I assume that a PMP is applied when ￿I < 0.
By Proposition (3) a PMP implies that tI (b aE) > 0, so that:
￿
￿
￿I (b aE) ￿ w
￿
> 0: (51)











((1 ￿ p)(wa ￿ w) ￿ c)g (a)da ￿ ￿w(G(b a) ￿ G(b aE)) > 0: (52)
Take the ￿rst and second terms of (52), I change the upper limit by A and I add
￿c(1 ￿ G(b a)) to the left hand side of that expression. These transformations do not
change the inequality. I denote this new expression by e ￿I, which is equal to:
e ￿I = ￿￿
A Z
b aE
W (a)g (a)da + ￿yI (1 ￿ G(b aE)) + ￿c(1 ￿ G(b a)) + (53)
+BE ￿ ￿w(G(b a) ￿ G(b aE));
e ￿I > 0:
The second term of e ￿I is smaller than that of ￿I since I assumed that ￿I < 0, i.e.
yI < y. Thereby, I get a contradiction: e ￿I < ￿I < 0.
Now I turn to prove the second part, that is: ￿I < 0 ) RMP. Assume that ￿I < 0
and the government applies a PMP. By the ￿rst part, under a PMP I have Expression
(51), what implies that ￿I > 0.
By applying the same reasoning as Type I equilibrium migration pattern, it is possible
to show that: (i) a PMP implies that ￿III > 0 and, (ii) ￿III < 0 ) RMP.
Proof of Corollary 3.
Recall Expression (44). A positive (negative) value of ￿II means that the brain drain
increases (decreases) per capita income in the source economy. Assume that the gov-
ernment is applying a PMP. In particular, assume that the government subsidies both
education and migration. Therefore, by Proposition (3) I have that tII (b aE;aM) > 0 and
tm(b aE;aM) > 0. Let $II be equal to:
￿II (b aE;aM) ￿ w: (54)
A PMP implies that Expression (54) is positive. By integrating it over [b aE;b a], and
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Let ￿ be equal to:
￿ = ￿ (￿(b aE;aM) ￿ (waM ￿ c)): (56)









ag (a)da > 0: (57)










Then by adding $II and ￿, I have that ￿ + $II > ￿II. So that, ￿ + $II > 0 does
not imply that ￿II > 0. It means that it is possible that the government applies a PMP
even when the brain drain decreases per capita income.
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